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An individual's prior experience will influence how new visual information in a scene is perceived and remembered. 
Accuracy of memory performance per se is an imperfect reflection of the cognitive activity (awareness states) that 
underlies performance in memory tasks. The aim of this research is to investigate the effect of varied visual fidelity on 
the transfer of training to the real-world after exposure to immersive simulations representing a real-world scene. A 
between groups experiment was therefore carried out to explore the effect of rendering quality on measurements of 
location-based recognition memory for objects and measurements of any associated states of awareness. The 
immersive simulation consisted of one room that was either rendered flat-shaded or using radiosity rendering. The 
simulation was displayed on a stereo head-tracked Head Mounted Display. After the immersive simulation, participants 
completed a recognition memory task in a real-world scene by physically arranging objects (in their physical form) in a 
real world room In addition to the recognition memory task, participants also reported one of four states of awareness 
following object recognition. Participants were given several options of awareness states that reflected the level of 
visual mental imagery involved during retrieval, the familiarity of the recollection and also included guesses. The scene 
also incorporated objects that 'fitted' into the specific context of the real-world scene (an academic's office), referred to 
as consistent objects, and objects which were not related to the specific context of the real-world scene,referred to as 
inconsistent objects. A follow-up study was also conducted a week after the initial test. Interestingly, results revealed a 
higher proportion of correct object recognition that was associated with an awareness state based on mental imagery 
when the immersive simulation was flat-rendered rather than radiosity rendered This supports similar results from 
previous studies and extends them to the transfer of training. Memory psychology indicates that awareness states based 
on visual imagery require stronger attentional processing in the first instance than those based on familiarity. A 
tentative claim would therefore be that those immersive environments that are distinctive because of their variation 
from 'real', such as flat-shaded environments, recruit stronger attentional resources. This additional attentional 
processing may bring about a change in participants' subjective experiences of 'remembering' when they later transfer the 
training from that environment into a real-world situation.  
 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: User/Machine Systems - Human factors;  
I.3.7 [Computer Graphics]: Three-Dimensional Graphics and Realism - Virtual Reality;  
General Terms: Design, Experimentation, Human Factors  
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Human-computer interaction, perception  
________________________________________________________________________  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
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The utility of Virtual Environment (VE) technologies for training systems such as flight  
simulators is predicated upon the accuracy of the spatial representation formed in the VE. 
Spatial memory tasks, therefore, are often incorporated in benchmarking processes when 
assessing the fidelity of a VE simulation. Spatial awareness is significant for human 
performance efficiency of such tasks as it is derived from spatial knowledge of an 
environment (Lathrop & Kaiser 2002; Dihn, Walker & Hodges 1999, Williams, W. 
Narasimham, G., Westerman, C., Rieser, J. and Bodenheimer, B. 2007). A central 
research issue therefore for real-time VE applications for training is how participants 
mentally represent an interactive computer graphics world and how their recognition and 
memory of such worlds transfer to real world conditions (Mania, Troscianko, Hawkes & 
Chalmers 2003, Mania, Adelstein, Ellis & Hill 2004, Fink, W., Foo, P.S., Warren, W. 
2007). Previous research has examined the variables that communicate transfer of spatial 
knowledge acquired in a simulation environment, in the real-world and discuss the form 
and development of spatial awareness in VE training compared to either real-world 
training or training with maps, photographs and blueprints (Bliss, Tidwell & Guest 1997; 
Bailey & Witmer 1994). The suitability of VE systems as effective training mediums was 
examined and was concluded to be as effective as map or blueprint training. Specifically, 
research reported by Bliss, Tidwell and Guest (1997) concluded that configurational 
knowledge acquisition based on estimation of absolute distances and directions between 
known points could yield training effects similar to training with photographs and real 
world training. Furthermore, estimation of travel distance from optic flow is subject to 
scaling when compared to static intervals in the environment, irrespective of additional 
depth cues (Frenz, H. Lappe, M., Kolesnik, M., Bührmann, T. 2007).  
 
 
Past research often aims to identify the minimum system characteristics relevant to  
rendering computations and interaction interfaces that would yield the maximum 
performance on a task or the greatest sense of presence. For example, search objects 
rendered in global or ambient illumination have been shown to take significantly longer 
to identify than those rendered in a local illumination model, (Zimmons 2005). However, 
there is still the need for a study based on an overt task with the characteristics that is can 
be learned and it can be assessed in a quantitative manner. What if the visual fidelity of a 
system could be assessed across a range of applications? In this context we can ask: Can 
we interrogate the human cognitive systems that are activated when training within VE 
scenes of varied visual or interaction fidelity is transferred into a real-world situation?  
Cognitive Transfer of Spatial Awareness from Immersive Virtual Environments to Reality ● 3  
Which simulation characteristics should we optimize in order to match the capabilities of  
the VE system to the requirements of these cognitive systems?  
Because of the wide-range of VE applications and differences in participants 
across their backgrounds, abilities and method of processing information, an 
understanding of how spatial knowledge is acquired within a VE, complementing spatial 
memory performance per se, is significant. Common strategies may be revealed across a 
range of applications and tasks. The study presented in this paper focuses upon the effect 
of rendering quality on object-location recognition memory, and its associated awareness 
states when knowledge is transferred from an immersive environment into a real-world 
situation. Two visual quality conditions were employed within the immersive 
environment. These were flat-shaded computer graphics rendering versus radiosity 
rendering. The main premise of the experiment presented here is that accuracy of 
performance per se is an imperfect reflection of the cognitive activity that underlies 
performance on memory tasks in simulation environments. This is in line with past 
psychology literature (Tulving 1985, Brandt, Gardiner & Macrae 2006, Dewhurst, S.A., 
Holmes, S.J., Brandt, K.R., & Dean G.M. 2006).  
 
 
1.1 Memory for Spaces  
Accurate recognition memory can be supported by: a specific recollection of a mental 
image or prior experience (remembering); reliance on a general sense of knowing with 
little or no recollection of the source of this sense (knowing); guesses. Gardiner and 
Richardson-Klavehn (1997) explained the 'remembering' as 'personal experiences of the past' 
that are recreated mentally. Meanwhile 'knowing' refers to 'other experiences of the past but 
without the sense of reliving it mentally'. The work of Tulving (1985) first suggested that 
remembering and knowing were measurable constructs. Through a series of experiments, 
Tulving (1985) reported that participants find it easy to distinguish between experiences 
of remembering and knowing when self-reporting their experiences. The sense of knowing 
has since be further divided into two related concepts. Firstly, the correct answer may be 
just 'known' without the associated recollection of contextual detail associated with 
'remembering'. Secondly, the answer may feel more familiar than a un-informed guess, but 
cannot be considered as being known ('familiar').  
According to this theoretical framework derived from memory psychology, 
measures of the accuracy of memory can be complemented by self-report of states of 
awareness such as 'remember', 'know', 'familiar' and 'guess' during recognition  
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(Conway et al. 1997). Previous studies have investigated the relationship between  
recognition memory and simulation environments of varied visual and interaction 
fidelity. Such work by the authors of this paper revealed varied distribution of awareness 
states whilst overall accuracy remained the same across experimental conditions 
suggesting that measurement of awareness states acts as a useful additional measure to 
supplement that information provided by accuracy (Mania, K., Wooldridge, D., Coxon, 
M., Robinson, A. 2006; Mania, Troscianko, Hawkes & Chalmers 2003).  
Moreover, it has been shown that memory performance is frequently influenced by 
context-based expectations (or 'schemas') which aid retrieval of information in a memory task 
(Minsky 1975). A schema can be defined as a model of the world based on past 
experience which can be used as a basis of remembering events and provides a 
framework for retrieving specific facts. Previously formed schemas may determine in a 
new, but similar environment, which objects are looked at and encoded into memory (e.g., 
fixation time). They also guide the retrieval process and determine what information is to be 
communicated at output (Brewer & Treyens 1981). Different theoretical models support 
specific hypotheses regarding how schemas influence memory. Pichet's & Anderon's 
(1966) schema model predicts better memory performance for schema consistent items 
(items that are likely to be found in a given environment) claiming that inconsistent items 
are mostly ignored. Contrarily, the dynamic memory model (Schank  
1999, Holingworth & Henderson 1998)  are consistent with the idea that schema-  
inconsistent information for a recently-encountered episodic event will be easily 
accessible and therefore would provoke better memory performance.  
The work presented here aims to interrogate the mental processes associated with 
obtaining spatial knowledge during exposure to a simulated scene and transferring such 
knowledge in the real-world scene simulated. An object-memory task is performed in the 
simulated real-world environment immediately after VE training and one week after the 
VE exposure. The virtual scene was rendered with one of two levels of visual fidelity (flat 
shaded vs. radiosity rendering) and displayed on a stereo Head Mounted Display (HMD). 
A follow-up study explored memory retention a week after the initial study. The 
experimental scene consisted of one room depicting an academic's office. Central to this 
work is identifying whether high fidelity or low fidelity scenes are associated with 
stronger visually induced recollections ('remember' awareness state). A secondary, 
exploratory goal is to investigate the effect of schemas on memory recognition in the real-
world after exposure to the synthetic scene. Memory recognition studies in synthetic  
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scenes have demonstrated that low interaction fidelity interfaces (such as the mouse  
compared to head tracking) as well as low visual fidelity scenes provoked a higher 
proportion of visually-induced recollections ('remember' awareness state), while there was 
no effect of condition upon memory recognition performance (Mania, Troscianko, 
Hawkes & Chalmers 2003, Mania, Woodridge, Coxon, Robinson 2006).  
Broadly, desirable influences on recognition memory and the associated 
cognitive states may be ultimately identified and generalized to aid specific applications. 
To this end, previous studies have not yet explored the effect of visual quality on the 
transfer of spatial knowledge acquired in a simulated space, to the real world . It could be 
true, for instance, that for flight simulation applications it is crucial for trainees to 
remember mental images associated with instruments as opposed to recollections that are 
confident but not accompanied by similar mental imagery when their experiences are 
transferred into a real-world flight situation. The following experiment therefore explores 
the effect of training in immersive environments of varied visual fidelity on the 
distribution of memory awareness states measured in a real-world task. The fact that it 
has been shown that interfaces of low interaction or visual fidelity induce a higher 
number of recollections based on mental imagery when compared with systems of high 
visual or interaction fidelity, may relate to attentional resources directed to systems that 
vary strongly from the real-world. We now explore the effect of training in immersive 
environments of varied visual fidelity on the distribution of memory awareness states 
acquired in the real-world task situation and we endeavor to explain the consistent pattern 
of results mentioned above in addition to findings in this paper.  
 
 
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS  
2.1 Participants  
24 participants were recruited from the postgraduate population of the University of 
Sussex, UK and University of Brighton, UK through the use of electronic adverts and 
they were paid for their participation. A between subjects design was used. The 24 
participants were separated into 2 groups of 12 corresponding to two fidelity conditions 
(flat-shaded vs. radiosity). 62% of the participants in each group were female and all used 
computers a great deal in their daily activities. The groups were also balanced for age and 
gender and participants in all conditions were naive as to the purpose of the experiment. 
Finally, all participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and no reported 
neuromotor impairment.  
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2.2 Apparatus  
The VEs were presented in stereo at VGA resolution on a Kaiser Electro-optics Pro-View 
30 Head Mounted Display with a Field-of-View comprising 30 degrees diagonal. An 
Intersense Intertrax2, three degree of freedom tracker was utilized for rotation. The 
viewpoint was set in the middle of the virtual room and navigation was restricted to 360 
degrees circle around that viewpoint (yaw) and 180 degrees vertically (pitch). 
Participants sat on a swivel chair during exposure. The application ran on a standard PC. 
The frame rate was retained constant across conditions at 14 frames per second.  
 
 
2.3 Visual Content  
According to the training group that they were assigned to, participants completed the 
same memory recognition task in the real-world after exposure to one of two simulation  
counterparts:  
- HMD high-quality radiosity condition: A high quality, interactive radiosity simulation 
of an office on a stereo head-tracked HMD; referred to as the HMD high-quality  
condition  
- HMD flat-shaded condition: A low quality, interactive flat-shaded simulation of the 
same office on a stereo head-tracked HMD; referred to as the HMD low-quality 
condition.  
The rendered environments differed with regard to the nature of shadows 
(Figure 2). Flat-shaded scenes did not include any. Radiosity algorithms display view- 
independent diffuse inter-reflections in a scene assuming the conservation of light energy 
in a closed environment. In radiosity, surfaces of objects are divided into patches or 
elements. Despite transmitting energy to others, a patch will also reflect the energy from 
other meshes that arrives on its surface into the scene. These processes will be iterated 
until energy equilibrium in the close space is achieved. Radiosity produces colour- 
bleeding effects from one surface to another, shades inside the shadow area and creates 
soft-edge shadow with penumbrae along shadow boundaries. All of these results imitate 
the physical propagation of light in the real environment. The number of algorithmic 
iterations of surface light propagation as increased, it improves the radiosity's shading 
accuracy and polygon count.  
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Fig. 1. Real-world experimental space after completion of object arrangement task  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Flat-shaded (top) and high quality environment (bottom)  
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The colours of the basic frame of the scene (ceiling, walls, floor) were based on  
chromameter's readings based the CIE(x,y) chromaticity and luminance (Y) values of the 
light and surfaces of the actual room (Figure 1). These readings were converted to RGB 
in order to be used for the rendering (Travis, D.1991). The CIE (1931) colour space is 
based on colour matching functions derived by human experimentation and it 
incorporates the trichromacy of the Human Visual System (HVS). The usefulness of the 
CIE(x,y) representation is that it allows colour specification in one language, however, 
equal geometric steps of CIE(x,y) space do not correspond to equal perceptual steps.  
Before specifying display colours, it is necessary to compute the tristimulus 
matrix of the display in question. In order to compute the RGB tristimulus matrix, the 
chromaticity co-ordinates of the three display phosphors in CIE(x,y) space are required. 
In addition, the chromaticity co-ordinates of the white that the three phosphors of the 
display produce when turned on at their maximum are also required (Travis, 1991). 
Generally, the RGB system is a means for describing colours on a display monitor. It 
does not take into account the energy that is produced in the physical world in terms of 
the distribution over wavelength and also how the HVS responds to this distribution. In 
order to render the scene, the materials' diffuse colour needs to be specified not the colour 
observed under a particular light source. The final colour for each measured material in 
the scene was estimated by dividing its RGB value by the RGB value of the observed 
white in the scene, which is the colour of the light source in the scene. Using the relevant 
geometry and surfaces and illuminant measurements converted to RGB triplets as input, 
the rendered model was created using a radiosity rendering system (Figure 2). The final 
radiosity solution consisted of a finely meshed model which could be interactively 
manipulated. This was the basis for the application displayed on the desktop monitor and 
on the HMD.  
In order to maintain the parity of the environments with regard to the display 
update speed of each simulation given the different computational loads of flat shading 
and radiosity techniques, the maximum frame rate for both environments was set at 14 
frames per second (fps) using a simple frame rate counter. This frame rate counter 
function calculated the actual frame rate of the environment was running at, compared it 
to the desired 14 fps and paused the simulation for the amount of time corresponding to 
the differential in the frame-rate. Each environment was presented in stereoscopic 3D by 
applying a dual channel video technique.  
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The synthetic scene consisted of an academic's office (Figure 1). The objects were  
provided in their physical form in the real-world scene, placed on one side of the real-  
world scene randomly, and came from four categories:  
• Twelve consistent objects that were present (computer, monitor, desk, paper bin,  
etc.)  
• Twelve consistent objects, that were absent (telephone, pens, computer mouse,  
etc.)  
• Twelve inconsistent objects that were present (skull, Viking helmet, etc.). •
 Twelve inconsistent objects that were absent (soldering iron, wrench, etc.)  
 
 
The collection of these objects was largely based on a previous real-world study by  
Brewer & Treyens (1981). Consistent objects were related to the office schema, e.g. it is 
likely that they are found in a graduate's office. Inconsistent objects are not likely to be 
found in an academic's office, therefore, they were not associated to the office schema. 
This categorisation was the result of a pre-exposure study by Brewer & Treyens (1981). 
There was a total of forty-eight objects provided to participants in the real-world room. A 
subset of those is listed in Table 3. The test objects were roughly of equivalent size in 
order of them to be easily grasped and placed in appropriate positions, but also to control 
for variations in memory performance based on the size of the objects.  
 
 
2.4 Procedures  
The Inter Pupilary Distance (IPD) of each participant was measured prior to exposure 
and the stereo application's parallax was adjusted accordingly for each individual. The 
exposure time was 120 seconds in each condition. Once the HMD was fitted, participants 
were instructed to look around the room at their own pace and to examine it in all 
directions. At the start of the simulation, a pop-up window was generated utilised to 
acquire each participant's ID. Once the ID had been entered, the window was removed 
and a timer started. When this timer indicated that the 120 seconds of exposure had 
expired, the simulation was shut down automatically, ensuring that each test participant 
was restricted to exactly 120 seconds of exposure to the environment. During the 
simulation exposure, the room where the simulation viewing took place was kept dark in 
order to block any peripheral disturbance.  
 
Exposure time was determined by pilot studies that explored the relationship between  
exposure time, floor effects (the task being too hard) and ceiling effects (the task being  
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too easy). Participants were led to believe that this was a practice phase of the main  
experiment, thus, they were not aware of the experimental task to follow.  
 
After exposure, each participant was guided in the actual physical room where  
they completed an object arrangement task. The physical room was identical to the virtual 
room in terms of layout and furniture, however, there were no objects scattered around 
the room as in the simulated room. The set of objects mentioned above laid at one side of 
the room on the floor. Before the arrangement task started each participant was instructed 
to physically place the objects in the exact locations seen in the simulation. Every 
assignment of an object at a chosen location was accompanied by placement of two 
stickers on each object. One sticker incorporated a self-report of awareness states for 
every recognition. There were four choices: Remember, Know, Familiar or Guess.The 
second sticker was used to record confidence ratings. These ratings related to how 
confidenct participants were that the object was located at each particular position. There 
were five choices: No confidence, Low confidence, Moderate confidence, Confident, 
Certain.  
The participants were required to place each object at their chosen location in 
the physical room starting with the positions they were most confident that they 
remembered (Figure 3). Prior to the object placement task, awareness states were  
explained to the participants in the following terms:  
- REMEMBER means that you can visualise clearly the object in the room in your head,  
in that particular location. You virtually 'see' again elements of the room in your mind.  
- KNOW means that you just 'know' the correct answer and the alternative you have 
selected just 'stood out' from the choices available. In this case you can't visualise the 
specific image or information in your mind.  
- FAMILIAR means that you did not remember a specific instance, nor do you know the 
answer. It may seem or feel more familiar than any of the other alternatives.  
- GUESS means that you may not have remembered, known, or felt that the choice you 
selected have been familiar. You may have made a guess, possibly an informed guess, 
e.g. you have selected the one that looks least unlikely.  
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Fig. 3. Arrangement task in the physical room (left) after training in the synthetic room (right)  
 
 
 
Table 1: Dependent measures of presented experimental framework  
 
Memory performance  
 
 
 
 
 
Prior probabilities  
 
 
 
 
 
Posterior probabilities  
 
 
 
 
 
Confidence scores  
 
 
 
Idle time  
 
Count of correct placements of objects in the physical room in  
relation to object positions in the synthetic scene. Also, count of 
correct placements in the physical room a week after the initial 
training.  
Calculation of proportion of correct placements associated with  
each of the remember, know, familiar and guess awareness states 
during the initial study as well as during the retention test as week 
after the initial training.  
Calculation of probabilities that correct placements associated  
with each of the remember, know, familiar and guess awareness 
states are correct, during the initial study as well as during the 
retention test as week after the initial training.  
Global confidence scores for correct placements during the initial  
study as well as during the retention test as week after the initial 
training.  
Idle time is defined as the time during which the view direction  
does not change. Comparison of idle time across viewing 
conditions.  
Memory  performance  of  The scene comprised of consistent objects (objects which can be  
consistent/inconsistent  found in an office) and inconsistent objects. Of exploratory nature  
objects  for this study.  
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2.5 Measures  
 
Memory performance was measured by counting the number of correct placements of  
objects in the physical room, compared to the simulation. A count of correct placements 
in the physical room a week after the initial training was also conducted in order to 
investigate memory over time. Table 1 presents a summary of dependent measures 
utilized in the studies presented. For the purpose of this study each memory recall 
question included a 5-scale confidence scale and a choice between 'remember', 'know', 
'familiar' as well as 'guess' awareness states. The goal of this strategy was to identify the 
distributions of awareness states responses across conditions focusing on visually induced 
recollections. This could reveal cognitive variations that could not be investigated by 
focusing on memory performance only.  
Awareness state data was considered in terms of both prior and posterior 
probabilities. Prior probabilities reflect on the following: Given that the response of a 
participant is correct (correct placement of object), what is the probability that the 
participant has chosen a particular awareness state? Posterior probabilities, on the other 
hand, pose the following question: Given that a response of a participant was assigned to 
one of the four memory awareness response categories, what is the probability that the  
response (correct placement of object) is correct?  
Koriat & Goldsmith (1994) have drawn an important distinction between the 
amount or quantity remembered compared to the accuracy or quality of what is 
remembered. In the quantity analysis memory awareness states data were represented as a 
priori or prior probabilities. Although this notation does not follow the Bayesian 
probability theory principles for 'prior' probabilities, it was adopted as such in this paper 
following the notation of earlier memory research (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994, Conway et 
al. 1997). Prior probabilities were obtained by calculating the proportions of correct 
answers falling in each of the four memory awareness categories for each participant. In 
the accuracy analysis, correct recall scores were represented as posteriori or posterior 
probabilities. In order to calculate posterior probabilities, the proportion of correct 
answers from the total of answers given in each memory awareness category were 
computed for each participant.  
For participant n,  
xin  is the number of correct answers for the i awareness state,  
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x'in  is the number of incorrect answers for the i awareness state,  
i = {remember, know, familiar, guess} = {1,2,3,4}  
then,  
 
Pin  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P'in  
 
is the prior probability for awareness state i related to participant n,  
 
Pin =
 4xin  ∑ xin  
i=1  
 
is the posterior probability for awareness state i related to participant n,  
 
xin  
P'in =  
xin + x'in  
 
 
Whilst neither the Brewer & Treyens experiment nor this research included systems  
necessary to track eye movement, a record of each test participant's head movement was 
monitored through software as exposure time may affect memory encoding. Whilst this 
information is not at a high enough resolution to be useful in determining the time spent 
looking at each object, the amount and location of participants' idle time was monitored so 
as to ascertain that it was similar across conditions. Idle time is defined as the time during 
which participants' viewpoint or view direction doesn't change. Such measurements 
were significant in order to meaningfully compare memory recognition scores and 
confidence ratings across conditions because participants might not have distributed 
exposure time evenly while observing the experimental scene. Participants who, for 
instance, spent 120 seconds of exposure time observing just one wall of the room were 
excluded from the statistical analysis. Therefore, the goal of monitoring idle time was to 
ensure that idle time of participants across conditions as well as idle time for each 
participant observing sections of the room would be similar. A measurement was taken 
once every 4 frames, providing 3 measurements every second across all conditions.  
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Table 2. Means and Standard deviations for accurate object-location arrangement and confidence scores as a  
function of viewing condition (n = total number of participants per condition).  
 
Viewing condition  
 
 
 
 
Task scores for initial  
test (out of 24)  
 
Task scores for retest  
 
(out of 24)  
 
Confidence scores (out  
of 5) for initial test  
 
Confidence scores (out  
of 5) for retest  
 
Flat -shaded  
 
(n=12)  
 
11.91(3.57)  
 
 
12.33 (2.53)  
 
 
 
3.74 (0.65)  
 
 
2.93 (0.66)  
 
Radiosity  
 
(n=12)  
 
10.25 (2.95)  
 
 
11.50 (4.14)  
 
 
 
3.38 (0.69)  
 
 
2.67 (0.70)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Prior/posterior probabilities and standard deviations as a function of viewing condition (n = total  
number of participants per condition).  
Viewing condition - Main task  Viewing condition - Retest  
 
Flat-shaded  Radiosity  Flat-shaded  Radiosity  
 
(n=12)  (n=12)  (n=12)  (n=12)  
 
Prior (Remember)  0.72 (.19)  0.40 (.22)  0.56 (.22)  0.42 (.25)  
 
Prior (Know)  0.13 (.12)  0.30 (.22)  0.15 (.12)  0.29 (.22)  
 
Prior (Familiar)  0.09 (.10)  0.14 (.091)  0.20 (.15)  0.14 (.10)  
 
Prior (Guess)  0.05 (.05)  0.13 (.07)  0.08 (.07)  0.13 (.12)  
 
Posterior (Remember)  0.96 (.09)  0.87(.29)  0.94 (.08)  0.92 (.16)  
 
Posterior (Know)  0.48 (.42)  0.89 (.29)  0.61 (.42)  0.73 (.44)  
 
Posterior (Familiar)  0.55 (.45)  0.61 (.41)  0.67 (.32)  0.53 (.34)  
 
Posterior (Guess)  0.35 (.38)  0.66 (.33)  0.43 (.41)  0.41 (40)  
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Table 4. The overall object's ranking in terms of mean confidence rating across all object categories. Note: PCon 
(Present Consistent), Pin (Present Inconsistent), ACon (Absent Consistent), Ain (Absent Inconsistent).  
 
Ranking  
1 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20  
 
Object  
Electric Guitar  
Poster  
Fire extinguisher  
Magazine  
Pliers  
Desk lamp 
Tennis ball  
Frisbee 
Monitor 
Hammer  
Screw driver 
Year planner  
Stapler  
Mug  
Picture frame  
CPU  
Keyboard  
Plant 
Bowl  
Books  
 
Category  
PIn  
PCon  
PIn 
PIn 
PIn  
PCon  
PIn 
PIn  
PCon  
PIn 
PIn  
PCon 
PCon 
PCon 
PCon 
PCon 
ACon 
ACon  
PIn  
ACon  
 
Mean Confidence  
4.458  
3.708 
3.417 
3.125 
3.125 
2.833 
2.708 
2.542 
2.208 
2.125 
1.960 
1.792 
1.750 
1.583 
1.458 
1.333 
1.208 
1.208 
1.167 
0.708  
 
 
3 RESULTS  
The participants completed the object arrangement task in the physical room after  
exposure. The confidence ratings and recognition memory scores were analyzed using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Memory performance scores in conjunction with 
reported awareness states lead to the calculation of prior and posterior probabilities 
associated with each awareness state. Confidence scores linked with correct recollections 
were globally assessed across viewing conditions as well as statistically correlated with 
the number of correct responses related to each awareness state. A retention memory test 
took place a week after the initial training.  
The total number of objects that were correctly located in the physical room was 
calculated for each participant after completion of the initial task as well as after the 
retention test a week after. The memory performance measures were subjected to a 2 
(viewing condition: high-quality vs. low-quality) x 2 (testing session: test vs retest) mixed 
ANOVA with viewing condition as a between-subjects factor and testing session as a  
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within-subjects factor, with number of correct responses as the dependent variable. Table  
2 shows the mean accurate recognition scores and standard deviations (in parenthesis) as a 
function of viewing condition and test/retest session. All effects were evaluated at a p- 
level of 0.05 to determine statistical significance. There was a significant main effect for 
testing session, F(1,22)=5.01, p<0.05, revealing that objects were more likely to be 
arranged correctly a week after exposure to the simulated room, (Respective Ms 11.08 vs 
11.9, test vs retest) but not for viewing condition, F(1,22)=0.89, p>0.05. The interaction 
between testing session and viewing condition was not significant, F(1,22)=1.25, p>0.05. 
Respective performance means for test/retest are quite similar.  
Prior probabilities indicate the proportion of correct answers under each memory 
awareness state (Table 3). The prior probabilities for the main task were subjected to a 2 
(viewing condition: flat-shaded vs. radiosity) x 4 (awareness state: remember vs know vs 
familiar vs guess) mixed ANOVA with viewing condition as a between-subjects factor 
and awareness state as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant effect of 
awareness state, F(3,66) =37.44, p<0.05. . The interaction between awareness states and 
viewing condition was also significant, F(3,66) = 9.102, p<0.05. Subsequent one-way 
ANOVA analyses were conducted on responses in each of the awareness states separately 
with viewing condition as the grouping factor. There was a significant main effect of 
condition upon the 'remember' awareness state, F(1,22) = 13.39 p<0.01 (Respective Ms .72 
vs .40, flat-shaded vs radiosity), the 'know' awareness state, F(1, 22) = 5.50, p<0.05 
(Respective Ms. .13 vs. .30, flat-shaded vs. radiosity) and the 'guess' awareness state, 
F(1,22) = 10.28, p<0.01 (Respective Ms .05 vs .13, flat-shaded vs radiosity). The 
proportion of correct answers associated with the 'remember' awareness state was 
significantly higher after training in the low fidelity condition compared to the radiosity 
scene. The proportion of correct answers associated with the 'know' awareness state was 
significantly higher in the high fidelity scene compared to the flat-shaded one. Moreover, 
the proportion of correct recollections associated with the 'guess' awareness state was 
significantly higher in the radiosity condition compared to the flat-shaded scene.  
 
Posterior probabilities represent the probability that a memory recall response  
assigned to each of the memory awareness states is accurate (Table 3). The posterior 
probabilities for the main task were subjected to a 2 (viewing condition: flat-shaded vs. 
radiosity) x 4 (awareness state: remember vs know vs familiar vs guess) mixed ANOVA 
with viewing condition as a between-subjects factor awareness state as a within-subjects 
factor. There was a significant effect of awareness state, F(3,66)=6.17, p<0.05. There was  
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also a significant effect of viewing condition, F(1,22) = 5.793, p<0.05. The interaction  
between awareness state and viewing condition was not significant. One-way ANOVA 
analyses were conducted on responses in each of the awareness states separately with 
viewing condition as the grouping factor. Interestingly, there was a significant effect of 
condition upon the 'know' awareness state, F(1,22)=7.67, p<0.05 (Respective Ms. .48 vs. .89, 
flat-shaded vs radiosity) and upon the 'guess' awareness state, F(1,22)=4.64, p<0.05 
(Respective Ms .35 vs .66, flat-shaded vs radiosity). Observers who reported the 'know' 
awareness state were associated with a higher posterior probability or probability that 
their response was correct when exposed to the radiosity condition compared to the flat- 
shaded condition. Observers who reported the 'guess' awareness state were associated 
with a higher posterior probability or probability that their response was correct when 
exposed to the radiosity condition compared to the flat-shaded condition.  
Confidence scores were analysed using a t-test with viewing condition as the 
grouping factor and participant's confidence scores as the dependent value. Confidence 
scores associated with the flat-shaded condition were significantly higher than the ones 
associated with the radiosity condition, t(22)=21.60, p<.05 (Respective Ms 3.74 vs 3.38, 
flat-shaded vs radiosity). Correlation analysis between the prior probabilities derived 
from the awareness states results and confidence scores as well as memory recognition 
scores revealed a varied pattern of significant correlations (Pearson's, n=24). There was a 
significant positive correlation between confidence scores and correct 'remember' 
responses for the flat shaded condition, r = 0.60, p<0.05 but also for the radiosity 
condition, r = 0.61, p<0.05. Moreover, there was significant positive correlation between 
confidence scores and correct 'know' responses for the flat-shaded condition, r = 0.754, 
p<0.01.  
 
The prior probabilities for the retest were subjected to a 2 (viewing condition:  
flat-shaded vs. radiosity) x 4 (awareness state: remember vs know vs familiar vs guess) 
mixed ANOVA with viewing condition as a between-subjects factor and awareness state 
as a within-subjects factor (Table 3). There was a significant effect of awareness state, 
F(3,66) =17.43, p<0.05. The interaction between awareness states and viewing condition 
was not significant, F(3,66)=2.17 p>0.05. The posterior probabilities for the retest were 
subjected to a 2 (viewing condition: flat-shaded vs. radiosity) x 4 (awareness state: 
remember vs know vs familiar vs guess) mixed ANOVA with viewing condition as a 
between-subjects factor and awareness state as a within-subjects factor. There was a  
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significant effect of awareness state, F(3,66) =9.02, p<0.05. The interaction between  
awareness states and viewing condition was not significant, F(3,66)=.56 p>0.05.  
 
Mean confidence ratings concerning a subset of individual objects found in the  
scene are listed in Table 4. Idle time measurements were statistically similar while 
training in either of the two visual conditions. Participants who demonstrated extreme 
variations in relation to mean idle time or uneven navigation tendencies, e.g. being idle 
for most of the time or not having observed large sections of the experimental room, were 
excluded from the study.  
Detailed results concerning recognition memory performance for consistent and 
inconsistent objects in the scene were not calculated because this investigation was of 
exploratory nature and out of the main scope of the studies presented here. However, 
certain observations are included in the Discussion below. Mean objects' confidence 
ratings across all object categories are included in Table 4.  
 
 
4 DISCUSSION  
The results demonstrated that participants who trained in the low fidelity simulation  
reported a larger proportion of correct 'remember' responses while conducting the 
memory recognition task in the real-world situation compared to participants trained in 
the high fidelity simulation. These results were consistent with previous findings that 
associated a larger proportion of correct 'remember' responses with low visual and 
interaction fidelity simulations. (Mania, Troscianko, Hawkes & Chalmers 2003; Mania, 
Woolridge, Coxon & Robinson, 2006). The results observed consistently in previous 
studies was also observed in this study despite the fact that participants physically 
performed the task in the real-world room after training in its simulated counterpart, an 
ecologically plausible training scenario.  
Recent developments in psychological research have shown that distinctive  
information  or  experiences  generate  more  awareness  states  associated with  
'remembering'. For example, participants who are shown typical and distinctive faces are 
more likely to recognise the distinctive faces in a later memory test with an 
accompanying experience of 'remembering' (Brandt, Macrae, Schloerscheidt, & Milne 
2003). Similar results have also been found using other stimuli such as forenames 
(Brandt, Gardiner, & Macrae 2006).  
In the current context, a low fidelity rendered simulation could be considered as being 
more distinctive than a high fidelity rendered simulation because of its variation from  
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'real'. Given that these are immersive environments, distinctiveness in this instance  
would be judged relative to reality. The less 'real' the environment is, the more 
distinctive it can be considered. It would be expected that a more distinctive immersive 
environment (e.g. low fidelity one) would result in more 'remember' responses than a less 
distinctive immersive environment (e.g. a high fidelity one). It is worth noting that 
distinctiveness in this sense may not only refer to visual distinctiveness but to motor 
responses to the environments (Mania, Troscianko, Hawkes & Chalmers 2003). The 
important variable therefore appears to be differentiation relative to multiple aspects of 
reality (e.g. visual appearance of, and, motor responses within). Here, higher confidence 
scores associated with the flat-shaded condition compared to confidence of recollections 
after training in the radiosity condition further support this suggestion.  
Whilst the relationship between distinctiveness and memory may prove useful in 
explaining these effects it is important to consider what cognitive processes may underlie 
such a relationship. Previous psychological research has indicated that 'remember' 
responses require more attentional processing in the first instance than those based on 
familiarity (Parkin, Gardiner, & Rosser 1995; Brandt et al. 2003). A tentative claim 
would therefore be: immersive environments that are distinctive recruit more attentional  
resources. This additional attentional processing may  bring about a change in  
participants' subjective experiences of 'remembering' when they later recall the 
environment. This change would therefore lead to an increase in the experience of 
'remembering'. Interestingly, this effect was not observed during the retest that revealed 
similar proportions of awareness states distributed across the viewing conditions . It is 
likely that the fidelity of the training environment only affects awareness states when 
transfer of training is tested immediately. As time goes by, the enhanced attentional 
resources associated with low fidelity environments do not influence the long-term 
memories associated with the training simulation.  
Moreover, it is found here that more correct 'know' responses are reported after 
training in the high fidelity rendered simulation than in the low fidelity rendered 
simulation. This would suggest a shift from 'remember' responses to 'know' responses. 
Memories that are accompanied with a feeling of 'remembering' for participants in the low 
fidelity simulation are only accompanied with a feeling of 'knowing' in the high fidelity 
simulation. In line with suggestions made above, this could be explained on the basis of 
reduced attentional processing of these items in the high fidelity simulation.  
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Finally, there is preliminary support for an inconsistency effect. Better memory  
performance was observed for inconsistent objects in the scene based on the top 10 spots 
in the overall confidence ranking. Only 3 out of 10 of these were consistent, present, 
objects (shown in table 4). Specifically, the electric guitar, one of the most salient objects 
in an academic's office, induced confident recollections. Certain 'absent' objects were also 
incorrectly assigned to specific locations. Further investigations should further explore 
such effects in relation to specific objects assigned to each memory awareness state. We 
are in the process of investigating the effect of low quality rendering such as wireframe 
rendering on communicating 'meaning' or schemas of real-world contexts. The degree to 
which an environment recruits attention is likely to be extremely important in relation to 
cognitive strategies at play during spatial knowledge acquisition in synthetic scenes.  
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